Comment se défendre contre les exigences de l'ALENA
M. Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N. , Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexique (CIDE) .
Projet de recherche
Pays en voie de développement et processus de négociation commerciale
Mots-clésALENA - Energie - Mexique - PEMEX - Pétrochimie - Pétrole - Pétrole mexicain - Petróleos Mexicanos
Ce résumé n'existe qu'en anglais
On August 12, 1992 Mexico, the U.S. and Canada finally completed the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which had started more than a year earlier. They were unprecedented trade negotiations in that they posed Mexico, a developing country, against the world’s sole remaining superpower in an attempt to establish a deep integration agreement. There was little precedent to fall back on, and it was largely expected that the U.S. would virtually dictate the agreement, given the huge power asymmetries between the negotiating parties.
This paper examines the role played by Mexico’s strategy choice, negotiator beliefs, domestic politics and markets on the outcome, that is, on the successful defense against value claiming by the U.S. during NAFTA energy negotiations. It proceeds as follows: section one presents Mexico’s negotiating position in a number of energy related issues, and the outcome of negotiations in each of these issues; section two presents alternative explanations that leave out the negotiations process and notes how they cannot account for the outcome, and then addresses key concepts developed in Odell 2000 to account for the outcome of NAFTA negotiations in energy. The final section summarizes the findings, considers the extent to which the lessons derived from Mexico’s experience in NAFTA can be applied to other situations where defense against value claiming is a central part of the negotiation process, and suggests avenues for further inquiry into this topic.
Getting to “No:” Defending Against Demands in NAFTA
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